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Abstract
This paper studies how an optimal wage contract can be implemented using stock options,
and derives the properties of the optimal contract with stock options. Speciﬁcally, we show
how the exercise price and the size of the option grant should change in respose to changes in
exogenous parameter. First, for a ﬁxed exercise price of executive stock options, the size of the
option grant decreases in the riskiness of a desired investment policy, decreases in the volatility
of return from the risky project, and increases in leverage. Second, for a ﬁxed size of the
option grant, the optimal exercise price of managerial stock options increases in the riskiness
of a desired investment policy, increases in the volatility of return from the risky project, and
decreases in leverage. Several empirical predictions are drawn from these conclusions regarding
the pay-performance sensitivity of management compensation.
KEY WORDS: Leverage, volatility, executive stock options, optimal contract.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D82, G32, J33.1. Introduction
The last decade has seen an explosive use of stock options as an incentive device for top
management of corporations. For example, Yermack (1995) estimates that, for 793 major US
corporations, the value of stock options represented about one-third of total CEO compensation
in the early 1990s. Murphy (1999) reports that the value of executive stock options has
increased to more than a half of total compensation in 1998 for top 200 US corporations.
Despite the recent global downturn, stock options are still one of the most important tools for
corporations around the world in motivating their chief executives oﬃcers.
Since the seminal work of Jensen and Murphy (1990), there is now a large body of empirical
literature studying the incentive eﬀects of executive stock options.(1) These studies generally
report that the most of incentives to CEOs are provided through stock options and that,
when options are properly valued, the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation
is larger than that originally estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990). Though not as rich
as the empirical literature, several theoretical studies focus on how stock options motivate
managers. Haugen and Senbet (1981) show that the mix of put and call options can mitigate
the asset substitution problem. Carpenter (2000) argues that executive stock options may not
necessarily encourage excessive risk-taking for risk-averse portfolio managers. However, her
focus is on the manager’s trading strategy, rather than on the characterization of an optimal
contract with stock options. Hall and Murphy (2000) present an example where executive stock
options granted at-the-money can be optimal. Saly (1994) argues that repricing executive stock
options can be optimal in business downturn. Acharya et al. (2000) also show that resetting
the exercise price of executive stock options can be optimal under some circumstances. The
positive eﬀect of repricing is generally supported by Brenner et al. (2000), and Chance et al.
(2000).
The purpose of this study is to provide additional insight to the theoretical literature by
characterizing an optimal contract with stock options. In doing so, we extend the model of
John and John (1993), in which the manager can gather private information before making an
(1) Some examples are Yermack (1995), Core and Guay (1998), Hall and Liebman (1998), and Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999).
1investment decision, and the owner’s equity and external debt are necessary for the investment.
The manager’s investment decision is a dichotomous one of choosing between a safe and a risky
project. The owner designs a managerial contract which can induce the manager to implement
the investment policy desired by the owner. The managerial contract consists of a base salary
and incentive components. Incentive components are either a bonus based on the return from
investment or stock options. Managerial contracts as well as the manager’s investment decision
are observed by the market, which then prices the ﬁrm and the debt in a way consistent with
these observations.
This paper ﬁrst shows how a conventional wage contract should be designed in an incentive-
compatible way. This involves rewarding the manager with a bonus when the risky project
with a positive net present value is chosen. The resulting optimal contract thus has the usual
monotonicity property. We then show how stock options can replicate the incentives provided
through the wage contract. This enables us to better understand the nature of incentives that
stock options generate. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate how the bonus parameter under the wage
contract is related to the exercise price and the size of the option grant under the stock options
contract. Next we perform the comparative statics of the optimal stock options contract with
respect to the ﬁrm’s leverage and the volatility of return. This generates a number of testable
hypotheses.
First, for a ﬁxed exercise price of managerial stock options, the size of the option grant
decreases in the riskiness of a desired investment policy, decreases in the volatility of return
from the risky project, and increases in leverage. The intuition behind the ﬁrst result becomes
clear if one identiﬁes the value of stock options with the bonus under the wage contract. For a
ﬁxed exercise price, the value of options increases when the size of the option grant increases.
Since the bonus is a reward when the manager takes a proﬁtable risk, it follows that the size
of the option grant should decrease if the owner wants to induce the manager to choose a
more conservative investment policy. Next, an increase in the volatility of return increases the
value of options, which would lead the manager to choose the risky project more often unless
such incentives are countered. Thus, for a ﬁxed exercise price, the size of the option grant
needs to be decreased when the volatility increases. The size of the option grant in our model
reﬂects the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. It follows then that the
2pay-performance sensitivity should decrease in the volatility of the ﬁrm’s return.(2) Finally,
an increase in leverage decreases the value of options by raising the eﬀective exercise price of
options, which is the sum of the exercise price and the face value of debt. For a ﬁxed exercise
price, the size of the options grant should therefore increase when the ﬁrm has more debt in
its capital structure. This leads to a hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity should
increase in leverage.(3)
Second, for a ﬁxed size of the option grant, the optimal exercise price of managerial stock
options increases in the riskiness of a desired investment policy, increases in the volatility of
return from the risky project, and decreases in leverage. This follows straightforwardly since
the exercise price and the size of the option grant are inversely related in determining the
value of a stock options contract. While the exercise price of executive stock options is also
a contractual variable, it is usually the case that the exercise price is set equal to the grant
date stock price. It warrants an explanation whether such a practice of granting at-the-money
options is the result of optimal contracting or out of mere convenience.(4) Our result shows
how the exercise price has to be chosen optimally when exogenous parameters change. In
particular, the last observation suggests that higher leverage calls for a decrease in the exercise
price to leave the eﬀective exercise price unchanged. This prediction is supported by Garvey
and Mawani (1999) who ﬁnd from Canadian data that more levered ﬁrms tend to set the
exercise price lower so that the eﬀective exercise price faced by executives remains more or less
independent of leverage.
An additional conclusion from this study is that ﬁnancial leverage should not necessarily
distort the investment decision made by managers who are motivated by self-interest. Nu-
merous previous studies have provided various solutions to this asset substitution problem.
(2) Using the data from the 1,500 S&P corporations for the period of 1993-1996, Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) report that the executive’s pay-performance sensitivity decreases in the variance of the ﬁrm’s perfor-
mance. They provide an alternative explanation based on the risk-sharing aspect of an optimal contract for
risk-averse executives.
(3) John and John (1993) analyzed optimal CEO compensation that mitigates the asset substitution problem
when the ﬁrm has debt in its capital structure. While their focus is not on executive stock options per
se, they derive a conclusion that more levered ﬁrms should sever the link between managerial interests and
shareholder interests by making smaller the pay-performance sensitivity parameter of the managerial contract.
The diﬀerence between their result and ours is explained in detail in section 3.
(4) Hall and Murphy (2000) present an example with risk-averse managers in which the ﬁrm’s cost mini-
mization problem leads to a range of optimal exercise prices which includes the grant date stock price. But it
is not a deﬁnitive answer to why almost all options are granted at the money.
3Zender (1991), and Aghion and Bolton (1992) show how a ﬁrm’s internal control should be
optimally allocated in a state-contingent way to diﬀerent security-holders. Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994) extend the analysis to argue how such a mechanism can indeed control man-
agerial moral hazard. Berkovitch and Israel (1996), and Berkovitch et al. (1999) show how
a ﬁrm’s capital structure can discipline managers through the optimal replacement policy of
managers by claim-holders. While an optimal capital structure is not an issue in this study, this
paper is also concerned with optimal managerial incentives in the presence of external debt.
In particular we show how the exercise price of managerial stock options should be adjusted
to make contracts incentive compatible when the ﬁrm has debt in its capital structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
3 solves the model for an optimal contract based on veriﬁable return. Section 4 analyzes optimal
contracts with stock options and provides the main comparative static predictions of the model.
The ﬁnal section summarizes the main ﬁndings and concludes. Proofs not provided in the main
text are relegated to the appendix.
2. The Model
Our basic model is a slightly modiﬁed version of John and John (1993). The ﬁrm consists
of two agents: the owner (or the representative shareholder) and the manager. There are two
investment projects. A safe project, denoted S, returns I > 0 for sure. A risky project,
denoted R, returns x with probability q and 0 with probability 1−q. To make the results
of the paper in line with those from traditional option pricing models, we introduce additional
randomness to John and John’s model by assuming that x is lognormally distributed with
ln x ∼ n(µ,σ2). Denote the mean of x by π ≡ exp(µ+ 1
2σ2). The distribution function and
the density function of x are denoted by G(x) and g(x), respectively. To undertake either
project, the owner needs to issue debt for partial ﬁnance. The debt is a zero-coupon bond,
repayable at the terminal date, whose face value is denoted by D. The net interest rate is
assumed to be zero, and the manager’s reservation utility is denoted by W > 0. Both agents
are assumed to be risk neutral, interested only in maximizing expected payoﬀs. Assuming risk
neutrality allows us to separate the risk-sharing aspect from the incentive aspect of optimal
4contracts. Since our focus is on the qualitative characteristics of an optimal contract rather
than the quantitative valuation of executive stock options, risk aversion is not likely to bring
about changes to the main results of the paper.
Before making a project choice decision, the manager alone can gather information, which,
for simplicity, is identiﬁed with the observation of q. Without information gathering, the
owner and the manager share the common belief about the distribution of q which has a
positive, diﬀerentiable density function f(q), and a distribution function F(q). Given the
observation of q, the expected return from the risky project is
R ∞
0 qx dG(x) = qπ where
π =
R ∞
0 x dG(x) = exp(µ + 1
2σ2) was deﬁned earlier as the mean of x. Consider now an
investment policy which selects R for all q0 ∈ [q,1] and S otherwise. This investment policy
will be simply denoted by q, a cutoﬀ probability above which the risky project is chosen.









rx dF(r) dG(x) ≡ F(q)I + β(q)π (1)
where β(q) ≡
R 1
q rdF(r) is the ex ante probability of π given the investment policy q.
Since both agents are risk neutral, the ﬁrst-best investment policy is the one that maximizes
V0(q). It is easy to see that the ﬁrst best investment policy is q∗ = I
π. That is, q∗ is
a cutoﬀ probability above which the risky project has a larger expected return than the safe
project.
Since the manager is risk neutral, it is not hard to imagine that the owner can implement
the ﬁrst best investment policy using a variety of incentive contracts. However, whether the
ﬁrst best investment policy is in the interest of the owner depends on the cost of implementing
such a policy. This is particularly relevant if the managerial contract has to observe limited
liability. In the remainder of the paper, we study two types of such contracts: conventional
wage contracts with a return-based bonus and stock options contracts where the bonus is
replaced by gains from option exercise.
The timing of the model is as follows. Initially, the owner oﬀers the manager a contract and
issues debt. When pricing the debt, the market observes the managerial contract and correctly
infers the investment policy that is implied by the contract. Next, the manager observes q,
5and chooses an investment project. At the terminal date, the return from the chosen project
is realized and the terms of initial contract are executed including the repayment of debt. To
simplify matters, we assume that debt is senior to any cash compensation to the manager.
Otherwise, the default probability of debt will depend on the manager’s wages, which will
in turn aﬀect the price of debt. The only source of private information in the model is the
manager’s observation of q. All other aspects of the model are publicly observable. When
they are also veriﬁable, hence contractible, our focus will be on return-based contracts. When
we discuss contracts with stock options, we will simply assume that returns are not veriﬁable.
Nonetheless, they are publicly observable, and will be incorporated in the value of the ﬁrm.
3. Optimal Return-Based Contracts
Since the manager is risk neutral and makes a discrete choice of R or S, one can consider
a variety of monotonic contracts that are incentive compatible. In this section we focus on
linear contracts given by (a,B) ≥ 0 such that the manager receives B if S is chosen, and
ay if R is chosen and the return less debt repayment is y. Thus when the manager chooses
R, her compensation is 0 with probability 1 − q and a(x − D)+ ≡ max{a(x − D), 0}
with probability q. Such contracts satisfy limited liability since both a and B are
nonnegative. We further restrict attention to contracts satisfying individual rationality and
incentive compatibility for the manager.(5) Before these constraints are explicitly stated, it
is convenient to simplify the investment policy that will be chosen by the manager. For any
contracts satisfying limited liability, the manager’s investment policy can be represented by a
cutoﬀ rule. Suppose the manager chose R given the observation of q0. Then for any q > q0,
the manager should again choose R as the expected utility is q(ay) ≥ q0(ay). Therefore,
the investment policy includes the interval [q0,1] at which R is chosen. The implication is
that, given any contract, the manager follows a cutoﬀ rule for project choice.
To ﬁnd the expressions for the expected utilities of the manager and the owner, let us
ﬁrst see how debt will be priced in a rational market. It was assumed earlier that the market
(5) It is a routine to check that the revelation principle holds in the present model so that restricting attention
to incentive compatible contracts is without loss of generality.
6observes the managerial contract and infers the investment policy correctly as implied by
the incentive compatibility constraint. With further assumptions that debt is senior to the
manager’s compensation, and that debt can be repaid with probability one if the safe project
is chosen, i.e., D+B ≤ I, the price of debt is the expected payment at the terminal date. Thus,










dF(r). Here, the ﬁrst part of the second integrand reﬂects
the residual claimancy of debt when the return is less than D. Since x is lognormally
distributed with ln x ∼ n(µ,σ2), we have
R D














where N is the cumulative standard normal density function.
Using π = exp(µ + 1
2σ2), the price of debt can be determined in pretty much the same way
as in the risk neutral valuation of contingent claims (e.g., Brennan, 1979).
Lemma 1: If the market expects the investment policy q, then the price of debt with













is the expected repayment of debt under the risky project.
Given the contract (a,B), the manager can secure the base salary (B) by choosing the
safe project, and the share (a) of return after debt repayment by choosing the risky project.









ra(x − D) dG(x)dF(r)
= F(q)B + β(q)a[π − H(D)].
(2)
We now turn to the owner’s expected utility. Given the way debt is priced rationally, the
owner receives the price of debt initially, which cancels exactly with the expected repayment
of debt at the terminal date. Therefore debt does not appear in the owner’s problem. This
becomes evident once we write the owner’s expected utility given the investment policy q and
the managerial contract (a,B):
7V (q,a,B) ≡ F(q)D + β(q)H(D) +
Z q
0






r(1 − a)(x − D) dG(x)dF(r)
= F(q)I + β(q)π −
n
F(q)B + β(q)a[π − H(D)]
o
= V0(q) − U(q,a,B)
(3)
where V0(q) was deﬁned in (1) as the expected return from the investment policy q. In the
ﬁrst equality of (3), the ﬁrst two terms are the price of debt, the second term is the owner’s
payoﬀ under the safe project, and the last term represents the owner’s share (1 − a) of return
from the risky project after debt repayment. Note also that U(q,a,B) + V (q,a,B) = V0(q),
hence the expected return is shared between the owner and the manager.
Incentive compatibility can now be stated. If the owner wants the manager to choose the
investment policy ˆ q, then (a,B) has to be such that the manager’s expected utility from
choosing ˆ q should not be smaller than those from any other investment policies.
(IC) : ˆ q is a unique maximizer of U(q,a,B) = F(q)B + β(q)a[π − H(D)]. (4)
An optimal contract can be found from the owner’s problem:
Maximize(ˆ q,a,B) V (ˆ q,a,B) s.t. (a,B) ≥ 0, U(ˆ q,a,B) ≥ W and (IC). (5)
In solving the problem (5), we ﬁrst simplify (IC) using the relevant ﬁrst-order condition.
Straightforward calculation yields
Lemma 2: (IC) is equivalent to a = B
ˆ q[π−H(D)] > 0.
The implication of Lemma 2 is the usual monotonicity of an optimal contract. That is,
at any incentive-compatible contract, the manager’s compensation is larger when the return is
higher. With a = B
ˆ q[π−H(D)], the manager’s expected utility becomes U(ˆ q,a,B) = B[F(ˆ q) +
β(ˆ q)ˆ q−1]. If this is larger than the manager’s reservation utility W, then the owner can
8reduce B until the individual rationality constraint is binding. Moreover, since the expected
return from any investment policy is shared between the owner and the manager, and since the
manager’s individual rationality constraint is binding, the owner will always want to implement
a policy that maximizes the expected return. But this is the ﬁrst-best policy given by q∗ = I
π.
The discussions so far lead to
Proposition 1: An optimal return-based contract implements the ﬁrst-best investment
policy q∗ and is given by a =
W[π−H(D)]
−1




The reason why the ﬁrst-best investment policy is also in the interest of the owner even
in the presence of debt is that the market prices debt rationally. If debt is given exogenously
instead of priced optimally, then there is the usual problem of asset substitution. That is,
for any given D ≥ 0, the owner would want to implement the asset substitution policy,
˜ q ≡ I−D
π−D ≤ q∗. When D is optimally priced at the time of issue, however, such a problem
does not exist.(6)
The optimal contract in Proposition 1 has a natural interpretation. The manager can
secure B by choosing the safe project, which can be interpreted as a base salary. The
parameter a reﬂects the sensitivity of the manager’s compensation to the return, which may
be called a pay-performance sensitivity parameter. If the manager chooses the risky project,
then her compensation can be larger or smaller than the base salary depending on the return
from the risky project. In particular, a suﬃciently low return from the risky project can result
in the manager’s compensation lower than the base salary.(7)
With this interpretation, several observations can be made. First, to induce a more
conservative policy (higher q∗), the owner needs to increase the base salary and decrease the
pay-performance sensitivity parameter. This is obvious since the bonus or the performance
pay is relevant only when the manager takes risks. Second, the increase in the volatility (σ) of
return from the risky project should decrease the pay-performance sensitivity parameter. This
(6) We do not mean to say that the asset substitution problem is not important. At any point in time, the
ﬁrm may have some level of debt which has been carried over from planning periods long before. Insofar as
there is time inconsistency in pricing debt and covenants are not perfect, the asset substitution problem could
be real.
(7) Salary reduction for CEOs in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms is often observed in practice (Gilson and Vet-
suypens, 1993).
9is mainly due to the limited liability of the managerial contract. With a larger volatility, the
performance pay is larger when the manager takes risks as it increases the option value of the
performance pay. To counter this incentive, the pay-performance sensitivity parameter should
be set lower. As we will see in the next section, this observation naturally extends to the case
when the manager is paid in options.
Finally, the base salary is independent of the level of debt while the pay-performance
sensitivity parameter increases as the level of debt increases. The last point is in contrast
to John and John (Proposition 5) who show that the pay-to-shareholder-wealth sensitivity
parameter decreases in the face value of debt. The diﬀerence between the above result and
John and John’s stems mainly from the way compensation contracts are structured. In John
and John, the base salary is paid regardless of the ﬁnancial situation of the ﬁrm while insolvency
incurs an exogenous penalty to the manager. Therefore the only endogenous variable that has
the incentive eﬀect is the pay-performance sensitivity parameter. Thus it follows that a higher
face value of debt should be accompanied by a smaller pay-performance sensitivity parameter,
which has to be compensated through an increase in the base salary to keep the manager’s
individual rationality constraint satisﬁed. In our model, the base salary has an incentive eﬀect
as it is paid only when the manager chooses the safe project while the manager’s compensation
given the risky project is proportional to the return after debt has been repaid. Since the base
salary is independent of the level of debt, and a higher face value of debt means lower return
less debt repayment, the pay-performance parameter has to increase in the level of debt to keep
the manager’s individual rationality constraint satisﬁed.(8) These observations are summarized
below.
Proposition 2: ∂B
∂q∗ ≥ 0, ∂a
∂q∗ ≤ 0, ∂B
∂D = 0, ∂a
∂D ≥ 0, ∂B
∂σ = 0, ∂a
∂σ ≤ 0.
Interestingly, the pay-performance sensitivity parameter decreases in the volatility of re-
turn from the risky project only when the ﬁrm has debt in its capital structure. Suppose the
owner has enough internal capital so that D → 0. Then limD→0H(D) = 0, and so ∂a
∂σ = 0.
Thus the volatility of return from the risky project does not aﬀect the manager’s performance
(8) Yermack (1995) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant association between ﬁnancial leverage and incentives from stock
option awards.
10pay in unlevered ﬁrms. The reason why this is the case is that, in our model, the manager’s
performance pay is dependent on the return from the project after debt has been repaid. In
other words, it is a function of the shareholder value, rather than the value of the ﬁrm.(9) If
the ﬁrm has debt in its capital structure, then the volatility aﬀects the shareholder value by
changing the default probability of debt, which has to be taken into account when designing
managerial contracts. This as well as much of the observations made in this section can be
seen in the case when the manager is paid in stock options, to which we now turn.
4. Optimal Contracts with Stock Options
Denote a contract with stock options by Σ ≡ (B,α,k) where B ≥ 0 is a base salary
payable when the safe project is chosen, and α is the fraction of the value of equity which
the manager can buy at the terminal date at an exercise price given by k ≥ 0. In other
words, α represents the size of call options on stocks awarded to the manager. We assume
that the manager can costlessly borrow funds to exercise options(10) and then immediately
resell the stocks. Moreover, instantaneous reselling of stocks after the option exercise implies
that options merely represent a ﬁnancial incentive device. The issues of control shift when the
manager holds on to stocks after exercising options or how the exercise of options changes the
stock price are beyond the scope of this paper.
As before we will solve for an optimal contract by studying the owner’s optimal problem
subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Suppose the owner
wants the investment policy ˆ q ∈ (0,1) to be implemented. For a contract Σ ≡ (B,α,k) to
be incentive compatible, the manager who observed q < ˆ q should not have incentives to select
R. That is, we must have B + α(I − D − B − k)+ ≥ qα
R ∞
0 (x − D − k)+ dG(x) where
the right-hand side of the inequality is due to the fact that the options are worthless with
probability 1 − q if the risky project is chosen. Similarly, the manager who observed q ≥ ˆ q
(9) Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) use an incomplete contracting approach and the allocation of control to
explain why the manager’s compensation is linked to the shareholder value.
(10) Since we assume that the risk-free interest rate is zero, the manager can, for example, do this by using
options as a collateral.
11should not have incentives to select S, or B+α(I−D−B−k)+ ≤ qα
R ∞
0 (x−D−k)+ dG(x).
Therefore we have the following incentive compatibility constraint.
Lemma 3: The owner can almost surely implement the investment policy ˆ q with a




0 (x − D − k)+ dG(x) − (I − D − B − k)+
.
The left-hand side of the equality in Lemma 3 is the loss in the base salary from choosing
the risky project, which could have been secured by choosing the safe project. The other side
of the equality is the net gains from options when the risky project is chosen instead of the
safe project at the cutoﬀ probability ˆ q. Thus Lemma 3 implies that the loss and the gains
have to be balanced at the cutoﬀ probability ˆ q. Given this, the manager with q < ˆ q will
choose the safe project since the loss outweighs the gains. Similarly, the manager with q ≥ ˆ q
will choose the risky project.
If Σ = (B,α,k) is incentive compatible for the policy ˆ q, then the manager’s expected











qα(x − D − k)+ dG(x)dF(q)
= α

F(ˆ q)ˆ q + β(ˆ q)
Z ∞
0
(x − D − k)+ dG(x).
(6)
The last integral in (6) is the value of an option on the return from the risky project.
Given the assumption that x is lognormally distributed, it can be shown to be equal to the
Black-Scholes value of a European option when the exercise price is D + k, and the risk-free
interest rate is zero.(11) Denote it by P(D + k). Then we have
Lemma 4: P(D + k) ≡
R ∞





(11) In reality, the value of options to company executives would be less than the Black-Scholes value for
various reasons. First, company executives are risk averse with limited opportunities to diversify their ﬁnancial
and human capital portfolios. Second, unlike usual stock options, there are many trading restrictions on
executive stock options. See, for example, Hall and Murphy (2000). While these factors will become important
in quantitative valuation of executive stock options, they are unlikely to change the qualitative prediction of
comparative static analyses, which are the main focus of this paper.
12As shown above, debt eﬀectively increases the exercise price of options, hence reducing
the Black-Scholes value of options. What it suggests is that more levered ﬁrms should make
necessary adjustments in managerial contracts to take this into account. In the current context,
this could be done by either increasing the size of the option grant, or increasing the base salary,
or decreasing the exercise price. However, increasing the size of the option grant makes the
risky project more attractive, while increasing the base salary will make the safe project more
attractive. Thus an incentive-neutral way to account for leverage is to adjust the exercise price
since the eﬀective exercise price of options is D + k. As mentioned before, Garvey and
Mawani (1999) ﬁnd that more levered ﬁrms tend to set the option exercise price lower so that
the eﬀective exercise price remains more or less constant within an industry.
For future reference, we document below how P(D+k) changes as D, k and σ change.
As usual, the value of a call option decreases in the exercise price and increases in the volatility
of return. Moreover, debt and the exercise price have the same eﬀect on the value of a call





∂k = −N(ZD+k) ≤ 0, and
∂P(D+k)
∂σ = πn(ZD+k + σ) ≥ 0
where N(·) is the cumulative standard normal density function and n(·) is the standard
normal density function.
If Σ = (B,α,k) is incentive compatible for the policy ˆ q, then the owner’s expected
utility can be written as
V (ˆ q,Σ) ≡ F(q)D + β(q)H(D) +
Z ˆ q
0











qα(x − D − k)+ dG(x)dF(q)
= V0(ˆ q) − U(ˆ q,Σ)
(7)
where V0(ˆ q) was deﬁned in (1) as the expected return from the investment policy ˆ q. Thus
the expected return is again shared between the owner and the manager. Moreover the owner
can always choose an incentive-compatible contract which makes the manager’s individual
rationality constraint binding. This can be seen from the manager’s expected utility in (6): if
13the individual rationality constraint is not binding, then the owner can either decrease α or
increase k until the constraint is binding. Therefore, an optimal contract again implements
the ﬁrst-best investment policy as it maximizes the expected return. Combining the incentive
compatibility constraint for the ﬁrst-best investment policy q∗, and the binding individual
rationality constraint, we have
Proposition 3: Σ = (B,α,k) is an optimal contract with stock options if and only if
B = α






P(D + k) = W.
As is evident from Proposition 3, there is a continuum of optimal contracts since three
variables (B,α,k) are to be determined from two equations. For example, if the base salary is
ﬁxed for some reasons,(12) then the exercise price and the size of the option grant can be chosen
from the positive relation given by the individual rationality constraint. To study the exact
relations between these variables and various exogenous parameters of the model, we conduct
comparative static analyses below. In doing so, we need to ﬁx one contractual variable since
there are three variables but only two equations on which to base comparative statics.
We will divide the incentive compatibility constraint into two cases depending on the
exercise price. Suppose ﬁrst that the exercise price is set high enough so that options are
out of the money when the safe project is chosen, i.e., VS ≡ I − D − B < k where VS is
the value of equity when the safe project is chosen. Then the manager is paid entirely in
ﬁxed salary when the safe project is chosen, and in options when the risky project is chosen.
The incentive compatibility constraint in this case simpliﬁes to B = αq∗P(D + k), and the
relation between the exercise price and grant size is determined completely by the individual
rationality constraint alone. Since there is a continuum of (exercise price, grant size) satisfying
the individual rationality constraint, we need to ﬁx one of these variables for comparative
statics purpose. The following proposition summarizes the results of the comparative statics.
The exact expressions are provided in Table 1 where the two contractual variables in the ﬁrst
row are diﬀerentiated with respect to the three parameters in the ﬁrst column.(13)
(12) In case of the US, the introduction of ‘the million dollar rule’ has led to the clustering of CEOs’ non-
performance related pay around 1 million dollars.
(13) Since the relation between the exercise price and grant size is determined completely by the individual
rationality constraint alone in this case, one cannot conduct comparative statics while ﬁxing the base salary.
14Proposition 4: Let (B,α,k) be an optimal contract with stock options for which
k > VS. Then for a ﬁxed size of the option grant α, ∂k
∂q∗ ≥ 0, ∂k
∂D ≤ 0, ∂k




∂σ = 0. And for a ﬁxed exercise price k, ∂α
∂q∗ ≤ 0, ∂α
∂D ≥ 0, ∂α





— Table 1 goes about here. —
The intuition behind the above propostion is as follows. Consider ﬁrst changes in q∗. If
the owner wants a more conservative policy (higher q∗), then the value of options has to be
adjusted downwards. This can be done by either decreasing the size of the option grant or
increasing the exercise price. Therefore, if the size of the option grant is ﬁxed, then a more
conservative policy can be induced by increasing the exercise price. Similarly, if the exercise
price is ﬁxed, then the size of the option grant has to be reduced to induce a more conservative
policy. However, such a unilateral adjustment will lead to the violation of the manager’s
individual rationality constraint, which is already binding at the optimal contract. Thus a
downward adjustment of option value needs to be accompanied by an upward adjustment in
the base salary that leaves the individual rationality constraint intact.
Next, an increase in the level of debt reduces the value of options by increasing the eﬀective
exercise price. To oﬀset the manager’s incentive to choose the safe project more often, either
the size of the option grant needs to be increased or the exercise price needs to be decreased.
As such adjustments will leave the value of options unchanged, simultaneous adjustments in
the base salary are not necessary. Finally, an increase in the volatility of return from the risky
project increases the value of options, which again calls for either a reduction in the size of
the option grant or an increase in the exercise price. Again changes in the base salary are not
necessary as the value of options will remain unchanged after the adjustment of the grant size
or the exercise price.
These results parallel the ﬁndings in Propostion 2. With return-based contracts, the
optimal pay-performance sensitivity parameter increases in the level of debt, and decreases in
q∗ and the volatility of return from the risky project. With stock options, such adjustments
can be done more ﬂexibly as there are two contractual variables available. If the exercise price
is ﬁxed, for example, the comparative statics predictions of the size of the option grant are
15exactly consistent with those in Propostion 2.
We now turn to the case where the exercise price is low enough so that options are in
the money when the safe project is chosen, i.e., VS ≥ k. Then the incentive compatibility
constraint becomes B = αq∗P(D + k) − α(VS − k), which determines the optimal contract
jointly with the individual rationality constraint. Since options aﬀect the manager’s payoﬀ
under both projects, comparative static analyses are a bit more complicated. However, the
basic intuition is still valid when one notes that the value of options is larger for the manager
when the risky project is chosen. The results from comparative statics are summarized below,
while the exact expressions are provided in Table 2.
Proposition 5: Let (B,α,k) be an optimal contract with stock options for which
k ≤ VS. Then for a ﬁxed size of the option grant α, ∂k
∂q∗ ≥ 0, ∂k
∂D ≤ 0, ∂k
∂σ ≥ 0, ∂B
∂q∗ ≥ 0,
∂B
∂D = 0, ∂B
∂σ ≥ 0. For a ﬁxed exercise price k, ∂α
∂q∗ ≤ 0, ∂α
∂D ≥ 0, ∂α
∂σ ≤ 0, ∂B
∂q∗ ≥ 0,
∂B
∂D ≥ 0, ∂B
∂σ ≥ 0. And for a ﬁxed base salary B, ∂α
∂q∗ ≤ 0, ∂α
∂D = 0, ∂α
∂σ ≤ 0, ∂k
∂q∗ ≤ 0,
∂k
∂D ≤ 0, ∂k
∂σ ≤ 0.
— Table 2 goes about here. —
As mentioned before, the key diﬀerence between the two propostions above lies in the way
options reward the manager when the safe project is chosen. When the exercise price is low
enough, options can be valuable even under very conservative investment policies. However,
the beneﬁts of options will be larger if proper risks are taken. This follows since the manager’s
compensation under the safe project includes the base salary, which together with the value
of options should be balanced with the manager’s compensation under the risky project. This
is implied by the incentive compatibility. Therefore, comparative static results of an optimal
contract are more or less the same in both cases. Having this in mind, we highlight only the
diﬀerence bewteen the two propositions.
We start the discussion with the case when the size of the option grant is ﬁxed. Then an
increase in the volatility of return from the risky project leads to an increase in the exercise
price but not the base salary when the exercise price is high (Propostion 4). However, both the
exercise price and the base salary increase in the volatility when the exercise price is low enough
(Proposition 5). To understand why this is the case, note that an increase in the exercise price
16neutralizes the increase in the value of options under the risky project, which would have
resulted from higher volatility. On the other hand, such an increase in the exercise price
reduces the value of options under the safe project, which does not depend on the volatility.
To satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint, the base salary should be increased to make
up for the reduced value of options.
Suppose now that the exercise price is ﬁxed. The base salary does not change in the level
of debt nor in the volatility of return when the exercise price is high, but increases in both
parameters when the exercise price is low. Consider debt ﬁrst. A higher level of debt leads
to a lower value of options under both projects, which needs to be compensated through an
increase in the size of the option grant. But the decrease in option value is larger under the
safe project since a dollar increase in debt implies a dollar decrease in the value of equity in
this case. Therefore, the base salary needs to be increased to balance the incentives. Next, an
increase in the volatility of return increases the value of options only under the risky project.
However, a downward adjustment in the size of the option grant reduces the value of options
under both projects, which calls for an increase in the base salary.
The ﬁnal case is when the base salary is ﬁxed. Suppose the owener wants a more conser-
vative investment policy (higher q∗). This requires a reduction in the size of the option grant,
which will reduce the value of options under both projects, violating the manager’s individual
rationality constraint. Thus the exercise price needs to be reduced as well since the base salary
cannot be increased. Changes in leverage can be easily accounted for by simply adjusting the
exercise price without having to change the size of the option grant. By matching a dollar
increase in the level of debt by a dollar decrease in the exercise price, the eﬀective exercise price
of options can be held ﬁxed. If the volatility of return from the risky project increases, thereby
increasing the value of options under the risky project, then the size of the option grant needs
to be decreased to oﬀset the manager’s incentive for excessive risk-taking. However, this will
reduce the manager’s compensation under the safe project, which needs to be compensated
through a decrease in the exercise price.
The two propositions above lead to a number of hypotheses regardling optimal executive
stock options. First, if the ﬁrm wants to implement conservative investment policies, then
the pay-performance sensitivity reﬂected in the size of the option grant should unambiguously
17decrease and the option exercise price should unambiguously increase. Second, an incentive-
neutral way of accounting for leverage is to adjust the option exercise price one-to-one to
changes in the level of debt so that the eﬀective exercise price of options remains unchanged.
Third, the pay-performance sensitivity does not decrease in the level of debt. Fourth, the pay-
performance sensitivity unambiguoulsy decreases in the volatility of the ﬁrm’s return. Fifth,
an increase in the volatility may increase or decrease the option exercise price depending on
how other contractual variables can be ﬂexibly adjusted.
5. Summary and Discussions
This paper has studied how an optimal wage contract can be implemented using stock
options, and derived the properties of the optimal contract with stock options. The central
thrust of the paper is that the exercise price as well as the size of the option grant should be
optimally chosen to motivate managers. The paper has obtained a number of results regarding
these contractual variables. First, for a ﬁxed exercise price of executive stock options, the
size of the option grant decreases in the riskiness of a desired investment policy, decreases in
the volatility of return from the risky project, and increases in leverage. Second, for a ﬁxed
size of the option grant, the optimal exercise price of managerial stock options increases in
the riskiness of a desired investment policy, increases in the volatility of return from the risky
project, and decreases in leverage.
Several empirical predictions can be drawn from these conclusions mainly regarding the
pay-performance sensitivity of management compensation when stock options are a primary
instrument. First, the pay-performance sensitivity should be higher for ﬁrms in growth in-
dustries where risk-taking is an essential part of their success. Second, the pay-performance
sensitivity should decrease in the volatility of the ﬁrm’s stock price. Third, the pay-performance
sensitivity should not decrease in the level of debt. And fourth, across ﬁrms with a similar
pay-performance sensitivity, the option exercise price and the level of debt should be inversely
related.
Executive stock options are one of the most widely used tools in motivating top man-
agement of corporations. Despite the popularity, our understandind of the instrument is not
18entirely satisfactory. At least two directions of further reseach can be suggested. The ﬁrst con-
cerns the near-universal practice of granting options at the money. Hall and Murphy (2000) is
an initial attempt to this direction. To understand better the (non)optimality of such a prac-
tice, the current model needs to incorporate risk aversion of managers and a richer mechanism
whereby the stock price is determined. The second relates to the way diﬀerent countries treat
exercutive stock options diﬀerently for the purpose of tax and accounting report.(14) At the
core of this question lies the valuation of executive stock options to the ﬁrm and to risk-averse
executives. By modeling the manager’s preference in a way standard in the option-pricing
literature (Brennan, 1979), the current paper could shed some light on this direction.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: We will only show ∂a
∂D ≥ 0 and ∂a
∂σ ≤ 0. The rest are
straightforward. To show ∂a
∂D ≥ 0, it suﬃces to show
∂H(D)






2σ and let n(·) be the standard normal density function. Then
∂H(D)





. Using the expression for standard normal
density function, it is easy to see that
n(ZD)
n(−ZD−σ) = π
D. Thus Dn(ZD) − πn(−ZD − σ) = 0
implying
∂H(D)
∂D = N(ZD) ≥ 0, hence ∂a
∂D ≥ 0. Similarly,
∂H(D)
∂σ = −πn(−ZD −σ) ≤ 0,
and so ∂a
∂σ ≤ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3: The incentive compatibility requires B + α(I − D − B − k)+ ≥
qα
R ∞





0 (x−D−k)+ dG(x)−(I −D−B −k)+
. Given this, the manager who observed
q < ˆ q is strictly better oﬀ by choosing S, and the manager who observed q > ˆ q is strictly
better oﬀ by choosing R. Since q has a continuous support so that q = ˆ q is an event of
measure zero, the claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 4:
R ∞





x is lognormally distributed with ln x ∼ n(µ,σ) and π ≡
R ∞
0 x dG(x) = exp(µ + 1
2σ2),
(14) Yermack (1995), and Hall and Liebman (2000) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of tax and accounting considerations
on the use of executive stock options is not signiﬁcant in the US, while Klassen and Mawani (1999) report a
positive correlation between the two in Canada. This discrepancy may be due to the diﬀerences in tax treatment
of executive stock options in the two countries.
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R ∞
D+k x dG(x) = πN(ZD+k + σ), and
R ∞










πn(ZD+k + σ) − (D + k)n(ZD+k)

−N(ZD+k)
where n(·) is the standard normal density function. Using the expression for standard
normal density function, it is easy to show that
n(ZD+k+σ)
n(ZD+k) = D+k
π . Thus πn(ZD+k +
σ) − (D + k)n(ZD+k) = 0 implying
∂P(D+k)














πn(ZD+k + σ) − (D + k)n(ZD+k)

+πn(ZD+k + σ) = πn(ZD+k + σ) ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: The two equations that characterize an optimal contract are
B = αq∗P(D + k) and W = αΨ(q∗)P(D + k) where Ψ(q∗) ≡ F(q∗)q∗ + β(q∗). To
simplify notation, we will omit the arguments when necessary. For a ﬁxed value of α, totally

















−αPdq∗ − αq∗ ∂P
∂DdD − αq∗ ∂P
∂σ dσ















Ψ(q∗)N(ZD+k) where the last equality follows from Ψ0(q∗) =
F(q∗) and ∂P




∂σ = πn(ZD+k + σ), the others follow similarly.















−αPdq∗ − αq∗ ∂P
∂DdD − αq∗ ∂P
∂σ dσ





Proof of Proposition 5: The two equations that characterize an optimal contract are
B = αq∗P(D + k) − α(VS − k) and W = αΨ(q∗)P(D + k) where Ψ(q∗) ≡ F(q∗)q∗ + β(q∗),
to which the same algebra used to prove Propostion 4 can be applied. To check the signs
of derivatives, note that P(D + k) − N(ZD+k)(VS − k) ≥ 0. This follows since B =
αq∗P(D+k)−α(VS−k) ≥ 0 due to limited liability, which implies P(D+k) ≥ VS−k
q∗ ≥ VS−k,
hence P(D + k) ≥ N(ZD+k)(VS − k).
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22Table 1: Comparative Statics of Optimal Contract
for a High Exercise Price


























P(D+k) 0Table 2: Comparative Statics of Optimal Contract
for a Low Exercise Price


































For a ﬁxed base salary (B)
α k
q∗ −
αP(D+k)[β(q
∗)N(ZD+k)+F(q
∗)]
[F(q∗)q∗+β(q∗)][P(D+k)−N(ZD+k)(VS−k)] −
P(D+k)[W−F(q
∗)B]
α[F(q∗)q∗+β(q∗)][P(D+k)−N(ZD+k)(VS−k)]
D 0 −1
σ −
απn(ZD+k+σ)
P(D+k)−N(ZD+k)(VS−k) −
(VS−k)πn(ZD+k+σ)
P(D+k)−N(ZD+k)(VS−k)